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CONFIDENTIAL CHAT ON THE CRAFT OF BRIEFING*
Mortimer Levitan**
This chat on the craft of briefing is intended solely for
discreet lawyers who invariably respect confidences. It was
prepared for publication only after repeated assurances by the
editors that judges never read law reviews. Whether this is good
or bad, true or false, judges will benefit most from this article if
they remain unaware of its contents.
What briefs need most in this world is readability.' Briefs
should also be convincing, if possible, but unless they are read
by somebody, they won't convince anybody of anythingexcept their writers, of course. Briefs have a knack of
convincing their writers with the utmost of ease. Cases are not
won by persuading one's self of the soundness of an argument;
they are won by convincing judges-not courts, not benches, not
institutions, but lawyers who have been elevated to the judiciary.
Courts cannot read. With perseverance human beings can
acquire the art of reading, but institutions, organizations,
divisions of government can never be endowed with that artnot even by an act of Congress. Judges, who are human beings
by nature, lawyers by profession and judges by fortuity, can read
and frequently do, but with all of the fascinating reading
material on earth, why should they squander their reading time
on briefs that are dull, obfuscated, verbose, and downright
* Copyright 1957 by The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. This
essay originally appeared at 1957 Wis. L. Rev. 59, and is reprinted here by permission of
the Wisconsin Law Review.
** A.B. 1912, University of Wisconsin; LL.B. 1915, Harvard University; Assistant
Attorney General, State of Wisconsin since 1922.
1. When a lawyer persists in reading his brief to the judge, he admits in open court
that his brief is unreadable, i.e., so dull and uninteresting that no one would read it
voluntarily. Reading the brief becomes permissible boorishness in only one situationwhen the judge is sound asleep. It is probably because of brief-reading attorneys that some
judges have succeeded in developing such marvelous facial dishonesty that they can appear
intensely interested while hearing not a single word.
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uninteresting besides? The fact that so many briefs get read is a

tribute to pertinacious adherence to judicial sense of duty. When
a brief is filed, it is not fed into a judicial machine, which
comprehends, weighs, and evaluates automatically, and then
after whirling of wheels and flashing of lights-and occasionally
prolonged periods of inactivity--ejects the correct answer.
When a brief is filed, it is for consideration by a man (or,
possibly, a woman); which means that briefs must be addressed,
not only to a human intelligence, but also to human nature.
No brief should ever be written without some definite
purpose in mind. Neither convention nor addiction is
justification for a brief: the conformist should rebel, and the
brief-writing addict should seek psychiatric aid. There are a
variety of purposes-some commendable, some reprehensiblefor writing briefs. It is reprehensible, for instance, to write a
brief primarily to express an uncomplimentary opinion of one's
adversary; it is commendatory to write a brief for the purpose of
advising the court; it is neither reprehensible nor commendatory
to write a brief because the client insists-merely good business.
The most exemplary purpose of a brief is to assist the court in
deciding the controversy either for or against one's client, but
preferably in the client's favor.
The lawyer who writes a brief without a preliminary outline
would if he were a carpenter, build an edifice without a plan.
True, by persistently pounding away eventually a written
argument might emerge, and a shelter might evolve, but the
finished product would probably be bizarre rather than artistic.
Briefs dictated without preliminary outlines tend to be garrulous
monologues in which the lawyer strives to ascertain the
determinative issues by the "talking" method, rather than the
"thinking and investigating" method. The most meritorious
aspect of these briefs is that they do come to an end eventually;
their worst aspect is that they end where they should have
started. While time spent in briefing may be wasted, time spent
in outlining a brief is never wasted, for a skillfully prepared
outline invariably engenders a shorter, clearer, better brief.
The effective production of a brief depends, not only on a
knowledge of the law and facts involved, but also on familiarity
with the background, disposition, and intellectual endowments
of the judge. Different types of judges require different types of
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briefs; which is merely another way of saying that a brief to be
effective must be written with the reader in mind. A short story
intended for readers of True Confessions must be written
differently from one intended for readers of Harper'sMagazine.
In briefing, as in short story writing, effectiveness depends upon
pleasing or impressing the selected audience.
There are certain mechanical features that should
characterize all briefs, regardless of the identity of the judicial
target. For instance, black black ribbons2 should be used for
typing, not ribbons that have been pounded into pearl gray. The
days or even months spent in legal research, cogitation, and
dictation can be wasted by one anemic typewriter ribbon. A
brief may tax or insult a judge's intelligence, but when it impairs
judicial optic nerves the sensible judge stops reading and sayswell, just what do judges say when they vehemently conclude
that something should be consigned to a place noted for its
caloric climate?3
There are a number of other physical characteristics of
briefs that decoy judges into reading. A weighty brief-one
fattened beyond the capacity of a postal scale-might get hefted,
might get opened, might even get a despairing leafing through,
but it won't get word-by-word perusal. Slender briefs have
infinitely more allure than the obese type, and especially if wellproportioned-svelte, with emphasis supplied in just the right
places. Judges, like other human beings in this radio and
television age, are more likely to peruse an article in Readers
Digest than wade through War and Peace.
The paper chosen for the honor of being immortalized with
the words of the brief should have sufficient opaqueness so chat
each typed page will not look like a double exposure. It is
difficult for a judge to concentrate on the argument presented on
one page when distracted by the argument peering through from
the following page. There is, of course, little objection to using
2. Black ribbons should be instantly destroyed at the first appearance of telltale gray.
Their retention might tempt some recipient of a letter written with the exhausted ribbon to
sneak into the office and use the ribbon to strangle the secretary who used it. If this should

happen-and it should!-it is hoped that the case comes up before a judge who received a
brief written with the same ribbon.
3. This question should not be answered; it is posed only because of the editorial
policy against the use of the word hell in articles. It is generally understood that the rule
does not apply to faculty members of accredited law schools.
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diaphanous paper for the copies to be presented 4to opposing
counsel, because the chances of discovery are slight.
The effectiveness of an argument may be accentuated or
dissipated by the mode of presentation. An unshaved, dirtycollared, baggy-suited salesman handicaps himself in selling, no
matter how superior the merchandise. A carelessly typed, poorly
arranged page does the same thing, no matter how excellent the
argument. A small gob of jam on a single page can destroy
completely the effectiveness of the brief-even if the gob is
genuine Bar-le-Duc! Misspelled, misplaced, and misused words
create almost as much havoc with the selling of the argument as
the gob of jam. True, a word is a word even when slightly
misspelled; the difficulty is that the reader's attention lingers on
the mangled word rather than on the thought intended to be
conveyed. Misplaced and misused words distract attention and
may suggest vagrant ideas far removed from the argument
intended. As to misspelled and misused words, no remedy is 100
per cent effective, but one highly recommended is the purchase
of two good desk dictionaries-each costing more than a
quarter, that is'-to be used at least twice daily by the lawyer
and as needed by the secretary.6 As for the misplaced wordspossibly the best preventative is a secretary who majored in
English composition; and if that provocative helpmate is
unavailable, the next best thing is the purchase of a grammar for
adults and an elementary work on semantics.' Incidentally,
semantics should be a required study in every law school, even

4. While judges read briefs from a coercive sense of duty, lawyers are not thus
bedeviled. Incidentally, that may explain why some lawyers instruct their secretaries to
save all battered carbon paper for the preparation of copies of briefs intended for opposing
counsel. Or, could it be the secretaries' own idea?
5. THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (Random House) qualifies easily
and inexpensively. Really, two copies should be purchased, if the lawyer is to be spared the

embarrassment of having his virtuous "dictionary habit" detected by his secretary.
6. 'Intelligent and conscientious secretaries will naturally need the dictionary more
frequently than the other kind-assuming, dangerously, that there is any other kind of
secretary.
7. Any grammar, whether used or not, is much better than none; ENGLISH
GRAMMAR, by George 0. Curme, in the COLLEGE OUTLINE SERIES (Barnes &
Noble, Inc.) is infinitely better than none-especially if used. And as for semantics don't
buy LANGUAGE IN ACTION, by S. I. Hayakawa (Harcourt, Brace and Company),
merely for the prestige of possession; its value is dependent not upon owning but upon
reading.
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though it would result in precise and concise legal documents
and hence curtailed fees and less litigation. The only students
excused should be those who intend to enter the legislative field.
A brief should be brisk but not breezy; it should neither
dart nor dawdle. Arguments should not be delayed by patter, and
goldbricking words should be eliminated. The literary style used
in a brief should be influenced, rather than dictated, by the judge
who is the objective of the brief. If the judge feels apprehensive
in the presence of polysyllables, only monosyllables should be
used-although it may be permissible to slip in a few of the
simpler two-syllable words. If the judge reaches for an aspirin
after every complex sentence, use only simple sentencesalthough an occasional compound sentence may be tolerated.
However, even if the judge enjoys splashing around in Henry
James sentences, the literary style of the brief should be simple,
accurate, concise. A style that steals the show from the argument
does a disservice to the brief. Ornateness, languidness,
verbosity, circuitousness-these do more than steal the show;
they ruin it. A brief is not a pasture for the practice of literary
gymnastics by frustrated journalists; indeed, it should not be
considered a pasture of any kind but rather a cubbyhole just
large enough to hold the essentials, compactly and neatly
arranged, of a sound legal argument.
Most ideas when sufficiently understood can be expressed
in simple language. When a brief is peppered with Latin,
leavened with bombast, and frosted with sententiousness, the
writer unwittingly discloses his befuddlement. The test of a
lawyer's comprehension of a legal argument is his ability to
express it in language that can be understood by a layman. If an
intelligent secretary understands, the chances are that the judge
will also understand. Her failure to understand is the cue for
revision or redictation. Incidentally, if the secretary volunteers
the opinion that an argument is balderdash, she may be
officious, she may be impertinent, she may even be slightly
vulgar, but the chances are that she is also right.
The absence of paragraphs has undoubted value as a nonhabit-forming hypnotic. Briefs, however, strive to keep judges
awake and even alert! Lawyers, then, should develop the art of
paragraphing: it may not attract as much business as developing
the art of putting, for instance, but it certainly will lead to better
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briefs. There is always the danger that a non-paragrapher may
degenerate into a single-spacer-those sadistic knaves who gloat
over ruined eyes and mangled dispositions.
The secret ambition of every brief should be to spare the
judge the necessity of engaging in any work, mental or physical.
Not that judges are incapable of performing mental or physical
work; most of them can perform one or the other, and many of
them can do both-although somewhat reluctantly, at times. But
judges, like all cultured members of the human race, enjoy being
waited on. When, for example, a case is cited in support of a
proposition, the judge should not be required to read page after
page of dreary dissertation in order to disinter the one or two
important sentences. The brief should always disclose, not only
the page on which the opinion begins, but also the exact page on
which the pertinent discussion occurs. Indeed, a brief truly
solicitous about the judge's mental and physical welfare will, by
the simple expedient of stating tersely what was involved, what
the court did, and then quoting the one important sentence in the
opinion, spare the judge the effort involved in reaching for,
opening, and reading the report. If, perchance, there are actually
two important sentences, both may be quoted; but whole pages
should not be quoted even if they have the semblance of
importance: pages seem more important when printed than when
typed, hence the judge should be lured into reading the original.
The destruction of judicial equanimity by making it as
difficult as possible to find the authorities referred to in a brief is
a vicious sport that fascinates some lawyers. They place great
weight on a certain case, and then use heinous ingenuity to
prevent the judge from finding it. For example, if the case is
from a foreign jurisdiction they will give the state report
citation-which is unavailable to the judge-and refrain from
disclosing the Reporter System citation, which is available. They
may even give only the Reporter System citation for local cases,
apparently on the assumption that judges are required by law to
know the correct citation of all cases in the official reports. If an
English case, for instance, is reported in A.L.R., they omit the
domestic citation and use the foreign one.
Perhaps it may be permissible to give an example of the
inexplicable antics of an "inadequate citation" enthusiast when
he really tries. An attorney in his brief quoted three sentences
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from what was presumably a case decided by a court-at least,
he gave the name of a case, but he did not reveal the page on
which the sentences occurred, nor did he give any clue as to the
issue involved, the date of decision, or the geographical location
of the court. The only clue--a false clue, it developed-was a
certain volume and page of "Ann. Cas." Opposing counsel,
carelessly assuming that at least one case in the brief must be in
point, examined the indicated volume of Annotated Cases, but
the case wasn't there, nor was it in any other volume of
Annotated Cases. Had the attorney really succeeded in referring
to a case that couldn't be found? Opposing counsel followed
several false leads before deducing that the case-if it really was
a case-might be an English compensation case. The deduction
proved correct! Butterworth (B.W.C.C.) reported the English
House of Lords case-it was also reported in a least ten other
British sources, including Appeal Cases. The next deduction
also proved correct: the case was important enough to warrant
reporting in A.L.R.! Counsel had jerked three chatter
sentences-not crux sentences-from a paragraph in the opinion
of one of the Lords, as reported in A.L.R.; however, instead of
giving the volume and page of the A.L.R. citation (as any
considerate lawyer would instinctively do) he malevolently (or
was it inspired carelessness?) had copied the volume and page
used for the "A.C." citation (but without the year) as given in
A.L.R., but had substituted "Ann. Cas." for "A.C." The court
did not decide against the attorney because of the three
untagged, displaced sentences-there was, as might be
surmised, no logical basis upon which he could have been
upheld-and the court refrained from commenting that
desperate cases do not suspend the decencies of law practice.
Give a judge a citation he can use-one that requires the
minimum of exertion! If he is required to expend his energy
looking for the case, he may not have sufficient energy left to
appreciate the case when he finds it. Also, the citation should be
comprehensive enough for use in his opinion. The title of the
case should always be given exactly as in the report,
notwithstanding the occasional secretarial urge to introduce
inexplicable variations. That does not mean, of course, that if the
case is referred to ten times on one page, the full title must be
given ten times; once on a page is sufficient, provided the

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

nickname selected for the case is incapable of producing
confusion. However, it is an imposition on the judge to require
him to turn the page in order to learn the exact name and citation
of the case. The fact that courts in writing for lawyers use infra
and supra does not justify retaliation by lawyers when writing
for judges.
Sometimes lawyers produce the illusion of erudition and
industry by presenting notes and annotations without the benefit
of quotation marks, without anything to suggest the source or
the actual author. Now, the products of skilled annotators are of
superlative value in briefing, but there is a difference between
using an annotation and plagiarizing an annotation. Discovered
plagiarism invariably causes diminished confidence in the
offending writer; and although pretending to be the author of an
outstanding piece of legal research does not necessarily mean
the loss of the case, any deceit seems to give a brief an
unpleasant odor-and smelly briefs are not usually convincing.
Incidentally, these comments also apply to long overdue briefs.'
What is kept out of a brief is almost, but not quite, as
important as what goes into a brief. Success in the act of
omission depends upon (1) the intelligence and courage of the
writer, and (2) the intelligence, experience, and personality of
the judge. Profound knowledge of the subject is a prerequisite to
differentiation between the important and unimportant; however,
while the trivial and inconsequential should be suppressed, they
cannot always safely be eliminated unless the judge's valuations
can be predicted. For example, a judge who has had experience
with a number of somewhat similar controversies does not
require as comprehensive a brief as a judge struggling with the
problem for the first time. Judges really do learn by experience,
no matter what a few disappointed lawyers may say. In general,
the brief should contain nothing that does not serve a useful
purpose in the presentation of the argument-which includes, of
course, the creation of a propitious atmosphere for the argument.

8. Most lawyers can be relied upon to keep every promise they make, big or smallexcept a promise to submit a brief by a stated time, possibly because they consider such
promises a result of coercion and hence against public policy. It is suggested that if lawyers
spent as much time writing their briefs as they do in talking about them, there would be
very few late briefs.
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Regardless of provocation or opportunity, ridicule and
humor should invariably be eliminated before the brief is
submitted to the judge. In ridiculing an opponent's argument a
lawyer may be ridiculing one of the pet notions of the judgeand judges resent ridicule. Who doesn't? Besides, there is the
horrible possibility that the argument only seems ridiculous
because of inability to penetrate the recondite. As to humor, the
danger lies in the unfortunate fact that its success depends upon
the receiver as well as the sender. Ascension to the bench
frequently atrophies a normal, robust sense of humor, and after a
period of service-say, two or three days-a juridical sense of
humor begins to show: a mysterious, inscrutable, capricious
variety which turns into wrath too easily for comfort.
A brief needs something more than readability; it needs a
complement of arguments. The arguments suitable for briefs are
of two kinds: (1) persuasive, and (2) supportive. Persuasive
arguments are those which seek to induce a judge to decide a
controversy in a certain way; supportive arguments are those
furnished as a courtesy to the judge for use in the opinion filed
in justification of his decision. Persuasive arguments must be
sound in order to be effective; supportive arguments may be
spurious, for their use in the judge's opinion confers the illusion
of legitimacy. Supportive arguments really supply the decor for
the opinion, which usually is a skillful interplay between
intellect and unconscious motivation. Judicial opinions, while
belonging to a much higher caste, are closely related to the
written explanations which congressmen frank home to their
constituents in defense of their votes on highly political
measures: the decisions and the votes are not the results of the
opinions and the explanations, but vice versa.
Whether a brief accomplishes its objective of inducing a
judge to decide in one's favor depends upon many factors, one
of which is the persuasiveness of the arguments presented. The
difficulty is that there are no precautionary mechanical,
chemical, or psychiatric tests which can be applied to an
argument to determine its soundness or persuasive quality. It is
not sufficient to say pragmatically that any argument which
persuades a certain judge is sound in his court, although possibly
nowhere else; the problem is to determine prior to decision the
reaction of a specified judge to the available types of argument,
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a reaction that is necessarily dependent upon his social and
economic background, his education, experience, personality,
and ambitions. The personality factors, incidentally, are the
explanation of split decisions: when a court splits four to five,
for example, that does not mean that the court is composed of
five jurists and four mules, nor does it mean that the court is
composed of four jurists and five mules; it means, rather, that
honest, sincere, intelligent judges are impelled to different
conclusions by their diverse personalities. And it means, also,
that few legal problems come equipped with only one possible
answer. To aggravate the difficulties, there is nothing static
about a judge's sensitivity to various arguments. There really are
fashions and fads in the legal reasoning: a brief compacted with
cogent arguments may be considered almost chic today and
dowdy tomorrow or, more likely, next month-judicial lag, you
know.
The most persuasive arguments are factual rather than
legal. Possibly that is because Law has borrowed infinitely more
from Equity than Law has the courage to admit-which pleases
rather than annoys Equity. If facts can be clarified to the degree
that the barber, the grocer, and the shoemaker would consider
that a certain result should follow as a matter of common sense,
the probabilities are that the judge will arrive at the same
conclusion. True, the judge will listen attentively to protracted
oral arguments, will diligently read monumental briefs, will
spend precious hours in making personal investigations of the
evidence and the law-and notwithstanding all that, his
carefully considered judgment will concur with that pronounced
by the barber, the grocer, and the shoemaker. There is this
difference, however: the judge, because of his specialized
training, can express the rationale of the decision in profound
language that fits into the juristic scheme. An unfair analogy
would be the witch doctor who may produce cures without
knowing why, and the highly skilled medical expert who cures,
but can also give a scientific explanation-or, at least,
something that sounds like one. A plausable theory is that every
human being considers himself an amateur judge; when a judge
turns professional, his judgments acquire sanctions, but his
thinking habits fortunately remain those of the amateur. That
may be why judges are seldom priggish enough to carry judicial
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integrity to the point of national catastrophe. Moreover, if a
judge violates the commonly accepted concepts of justice in the
community, the legislature or successor judges will ultimately
restore judicial thought into harmony with community thought.
Facts have an innate faculty of looking different in different
lights. It is the function of a brief to present the facts in the most
favorable light, but that does not sanction distortion,
suppression, or expansion. Skillful lighting requires intimate
knowledge of every detail of the subject, plus some aptitude for
appraising
relative values and creating harmonious
arrangements. The difference between the unflattering likeness
produced by a snap shooting amateur and the artistic personality
study produced by a renowned portrait photographer is largely a
matter of posing, lighting, and finishing. The brief writer, to be
sure, must use words while the photographer uses light, but the
basic objective is the same: selling a picture.
The presentation of facts in a brief must of necessity be
quite different from the presentation in the opinion. In a brief
absolute honesty is mandatory; judicial license permits such
variations in the facts as are essential to a well-considered,
sagacious opinion. Richard III would have been poor drama if
Shakespeare had adhered to history; and many outstanding
judicial opinions owe their status to artistic factual
modifications. Lawyers sometimes are disappointed at their
inability to recognize the facts as they appear in the opinion; but
they should realize that the decision would have been precisely
the same even if the facts as stated in the opinion had retained
their old familiar looks.
Adroitness in the presentation of facts has one objective: to
facilitate perception of the imperative dictates of justice for a
favorable decision. To stimulate the judge's perceptivity,
invocation must be made to common sense, ideals, predelictions,
and vanity. The appeal to common sense is ordinarily the most
efficacious, for presumably both judge and lawyer have
unlimited supplies of that rare treasure, and both have the
variety indigenous to the community. The good judge, of course,
is the one most generously endowed with the highest grade of
common sense; and the difference between a good judge and an
outstanding judge is literary rather than juristic. The appeal to
ideals has an element of danger, for most people have internal as
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well as external ideals, and obeisance to the external ideal may
infuriate the internal ideal. All people have those unexplainable,
unintentional, illogical likes and dislikes that qualify as
prejudices-all people, that is, except judges, and they have
predelictions. It is wise, therefore, not to use arguments that
might bounce against some of the judge's petrified notions;
better stick to morality, patriotism, humanitarianism, and the
public weal. Vanity, that essential of human happiness, has been
the victim of undeserved deprecation. In judges, particularly,
vanity is a truly precious quality, for vanity is the most effective
preventative of judicial tyranny. No matter how overdeveloped
his urge toward absolutism may become, a judge still retains his
positional vanity: he craves universal recognition as a great
jurist-the greatest jurist, in fact-and this craving fortunately
imposes some degree of self-restraint. If a judge's vanity has a
voracious appetite for flattery, the type that needs a double shot
of flattery before breakfast, and double shots at frequent
intervals throughout the day, the brief should be drenched with
flattery; if, on the other hand, only small quantities are
appreciated, and then only if highly diluted, the brief should be
only faintly perfumed with thoroughly disguised flattery.
There are some types of flattery that add a pleasant glow to
a brief, and they are deference, thoughtfulness, and
consideration. Every judge is entitled to these, not always
because of his character, or erudition, or diligence, or amiability,
but always, always because of his position. The judge should be
treated like visiting royalty, not like a recalcitrant elephant. His
attention should be invited, not called or directed. And judges
should never be admonished to read this or that carefully, or to
pay particularattention to something or other. Judges always
read carefully and always pay particular attention to
everything-and for a lawyer to intimate otherwise is a
downright uncouth. Besides, in most cases where the intimation
is justified, it won't do any good. While courtesy is not
generally a satisfactory substitute for a valid argument,
sometimes it seems to come amazingly close; flattery comes
even closer.
It must be disconcerting for a judge to read a brief which
consists primarily of the lawyer's pendente lite credo. After all,
it really doesn't matter what the lawyer believes the law to be;

THE CRAFT OF BRIEFING

the important thing is what the judge believes. Still, briefs are
frequently littered with "We believe so and so," "We are of the
opinion," and "It seems to us." A brief should submit, contend,
or urge various arguments for the judge's consideration; and the
gratuitous, personal views of the writer should not be
volunteered without an express invitation-preferably
engraved-from the judge.
Solicitude for a judge's welfare should be shown, not
expressed. If, for example, guiding signs placed at strategic
spots throughout the brief would facilitate reading and
comprehension, signs should be installed. Not exactly the same
kind of signs used on highways, to be sure, although some of
those signs have possibilities of adaptation, viz., "Winding
argument ahead," or "Muddy when wet or dry," or
"Unreadable until repaired." Much more dignified, and
probably better, than the highway type of signs are synopsis-ofsynopsis headings-headings that trenchantly state the essentials
of the argument, both factual and legal. Headings that simply
enumerate, or vaguely refer to some fact or argument, or just
mumble in type, should be eschewed; the headings should
actually tell something to the judge. By way of illustration, a
heading like "Accident occurred," is neither as impressive nor
as tragically revealing as "Piano fell on Joe's head." 9 And
arguments and authorities clustered under the heading "Law
involved," are certainly not as effectively heralded into the
judge's consciousness as the same law arguments and authorities
introduced with the heading "Contracts must have mutuality."
If a headline-reading judge reads nothing but the headings, he
should acquire a conversational knowledge of the case; the
judge who habitually skips headlines will get the full story in the
body of the brief; and for the judge who reads everything in the
brief-and there are such judges, it is said-the headings will
differentiate the highly important portions of the brief from the
mildly important. The headings also magnanimously drop hints
as to what portions of the brief may be skipped. After all, if a
judge is already convinced of the soundness of an argument,
why waste time reading pages and pages of brief seeking to

9. Note omission of interesting details, like piano was a Steinway, Joe's head formerly

was curly, etc.
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convince him? Besides, there is always the danger that reading
might unconvince him.
Authorities and precedents frequently are very persuasive
in briefs, but only when they have been carefully selected and
properly distributed. Before precedents can be selected, they
must be discovered. Sometimes lawyers, failing to appreciate the
coyness of precedents, expect them to flutter into sight at the
opening of a book without any necessity for flushing out of their
hiding place. Search should start in the digests-especially the
local digests-for no matter what some impatient lawyers may
proclaim, digests attempt to make the finding of law easy, not
difficult or impossible. A hunter does not look only in one spot
for the hypothetical pheasant; he looks in many likely spots,
sometimes hour after hour, until he finds a real pheasant.
Precedent hunters should follow the tactics of the pheasant
hunters.t°
Precedents should not be selected for inclusion in briefs
solely on their intrinsic worth; the judge must also be considered
in making the choice. Naturally every judge considers his former
opinions the most persuasive, the most perspicacious, the most
authoritative, and these opinions have top priority. Secondary
precedents should include the opinion which most accurately
expresses the principle sought to be established (for clarity), the
opinion in which the principle was first enunciated (for
venerability) and the opinion which last announced the doctrine
(for up-to-dateness). One precedent which should be included, if
at all possible, is the one with the greatest vulnerability to
discovery by the judge on a research expedition: judgediscovered precedents acquire exaggerated importance,
notwithstanding their prior careful appraisal and rejection by the
attorney preparing the brief;" and the only way to hold those
cases down to their appropriately humble position is to cite
them.
The selection of supportive arguments is infinitely less
important than the selection of persuasive arguments; still,
judges appraise the merit of the brief almost entirely upon the
10. The gun, of course, should be omitted; however, since excellent briefs usually
result from "working like a dog," possibly the dog should be retained.
11. The same phenomenon, undoubtedly, that makes the fish we catch at least twice as
large as fish of the same size caught by somebody else.
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supportive arguments presented. And this is entirely proper, for
a truly skillful brief never lets the judge suspect that any
persuasive arguments in the brief had the slightest influence on
his decision. As to the supportive arguments-well, we all
recognize instantaneously the supreme sagacity of the person
who expresses ideas identical with ours. When the judge reaches
a determination, why shouldn't he think highly of the brief
which furnishes ready-to-use precedents and arguments that can
be incorporated into his opinion?
Supportive arguments and precedents should have
versatility, flexibility, tensibility-in short, capacity for being
fitted into place for the production of a scholarly opinion.
Precedents rich in generalizations are especially prized, as are
those in which flickering ideas are expressed in putty words.
And dicta-juridical small talk about questions not presentedshould never be overlooked! While fluent judges sometimes
seem to pad their opinions with discourses on divers interesting
but irrelevant subjects, 2 their dicta are really useful because of
availability as synthetic substitutes for authentic precedents. Of
course, if the controversy involved requires an opinion different
from that previously gratuitously expressed, no harm will be
done, because the court can always say, "That was mere
dictum!"
The character of the supportive precedential material to be
placed in any brief is dependent upon the nature and type-not
to mention vagaries-of the judge who is supposed to read the
brief. The general principles involved are illustrated by
considering a few types of judges not picked at random: If the
judge is the treatise-writing type, supply him with a
superabundance of cases, plus references to notes, annotations,
law review articles, and texts where he can find additional cases.
Cases should not be analyzed or collated, for that would
constitute usurpation of the judge's prerogatives; and infinite
care must be taken not to suggest that for hundreds, probably
thousands, of years, judges have been writing definitive
opinions-with obsolescence starting before the writing of the
long last paragraph. If, by way of contrast, the judge is the
12. If every judge were required to pay out of his own pocket the cost of typing,
printing and distributing his opinions, it is doubtful that there would be any substantial
decrease in the total volume of opinions.
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overworked type, 3 present him with a few sentences and
paragraphs that he can stick together with a few of his own
adhesive words to create his opinion before he dashes out in
search of needed recreation, such as eating, drinking, fishing, or
golfing. If the judge is the juristic type, simply use
discrimination in selecting terse, meaty quotations-with all of
the fat carefully trimmed away-from a few of the best reasoned
cases on the subject.
One essential ingredient of all good briefs eludes accurate
denomination-craftmanshipcomes close, so does artistry, and
even class or finish might do. It approximates the ingredient
which sets apart the amazingly expensive tailored suit from the
amazingly cheap hand-me-down. Now, while handmade
buttonholes are unnecessary to indicate superior workmanship in
a brief, some equivalent details of distinction are: all quotations
compared with the originals, with paragraphing and omissions
indicated; all cases thoroughly Shepardized; all references to
cases and testimony checked for accuracy; correct citations
supplied for all cases which in the process of quotations have
been denuded of all identifying marks except the exasperating
supra;the year of decision always given; the same style of citing
cases used throughout the brief; all repetitious, useless, or
obstructive material deleted. If the rules require printed briefs
but tolerate sham printing, submit genuine printing-not
because of the shaggy, unkempt appearance of the crudely
imitative printing processes, but because sham printing
processes do not permit the scrutinizing of galley or page
proof, 4 with the result that errors which escape detection in the
typewritten page appear vulgarly conspicuous in the printed
page.
Possibly a client cannot afford to pay for the time and effort
essential to a workmanlike brief, but this much is certain: no
lawyer can afford to present a cut-rate brief to any court! The
shoddiness of a cut-rate brief insults the court, degrades the
lawyer. Briefs are essential expedients of our judicial system;
13. Judges are never lazy; if occasionally they have that appearance, they are merely
exhibiting some of the atypical symptoms of overwork.
14. Failure of a lawyer to check the galley or page proof with painstaking care should
not be made a prison offense; two hours in stocks (if available) should be adequate,
especially since the dereliction usually inflicts its own punishment.
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they are submitted by attorneys, not only as lawyers for litigants,
but also as officers of the court. Just as a reputable surgeon will
not perform any operation in a hurried, slipshod manner merely
because of the patient's inability to pay, a reputable lawyer will
not submit a brief that is below his highest professional
standards, regardless of the prospect of inadequate
remuneration. In neither case is justifiable pride of profession
the fundamental motivating force; in both cases the impulsion is
a profound sense of obligation to humanity.

